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War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia:




I want to present three potential problems of the Yugoslav \Var
Crimes Tribunal which may limit the Tribunal's effectiveness. The
three issues are (1) the unwillingness of the United Nations to pro-
ceed with war crimes trials in absentia, or to effect international
arrest; (2) the sources of applicable law for the war crimes trials;
and (3) the failure of the United Nations to address the delicate
relation between politics and criminal law in the aftermath of a
civil war, specifically the absence of any pardoning power or
amnesty power in the political organs of the United Nations.
I. TRIALS IN ABSENTIA AND INTERNATIONAL ARREST
The actors guilty of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia
should not escape conviction because they refuse to come to court.
When U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali solicited
suggestions for an ad hoc tribunal, the French proposed in absentia
jurisdiction. In the French scheme, if a defendant was indicted by
the war crimes prosecutor and the indictment was approved by a
chamber of the tribunal, the trial could go fonvard even if a
defendant refused to appear.! The Secretary-General recom-
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See Letter Dated 10 February 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, I{ 108, U.N. Doc. 5125266 (report
of the Committee of French Jurists). If the defendant voluntarily appeared or was later
arrested, he would have the privilege of reopening the proceedings.
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mended against the French proposal, and the Security Council fol-
lowed suit.
The Secretary-General argued that in absentia jurisdiction would
strain article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which guarantees a defendant the right "[t]o be tried in his
presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assist-
ance of his own choosing."2 The Secretary-General may have cho-
sen the less controversial route by not allowing trials in absentia.
Perhaps it was not the right one.
The ban on trials in absentia is not universal in domestic legal
systems. The French allow in absentia trials within their legal sys-
tem even for felony cases.3 In the United States, trials do not go
forward unless the defendant is arrested and brought to the court
for the initial swearing of the jury. Nonetheless, if he chooses to
absent himself in the middle of trial-violating bail in flight from
the jurisdiction-the trial goes on without him.4 Similarly, if the
defendant disrupts the trial by shouting or threatening witnesses,
he can be removed from the courtroom.s A good judge will try to
make it possible to follow the proceedings by television or tele-
phone, but in the United States there is no constitutional right to
have every moment of the trial conducted in the defendant's pres-
ence under these circumstances.
For a national legal system, there may be good reasons for not
allowing trials in absentia. Legal norms can usually be enforced to
an adequate degree within this rule. A national government is
capable of bringing most defendants to the bar by coercive means,
and in a national system, we accept that not all crimes will be
prosecuted.
National legal systems are different in other respects, too. The
limitation excluding in absentia trials from the criminal adjudica-
tive jurisdiction of domestic courts is a nice proxy for circumscrib-
ing the reach of lawmakers' prescriptive jurisdiction. An American
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171,6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23,1976); see Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Ij( 101, U.N. Doc. S/
25704 (1993).
3. See Richard Frase, Introduction, The French Code of Criminal Procedure 23 (1988);
see also Code de Procedure Penale, arts. 627-32 (Fr.). The default conviction is reopened if
the defendant is later found. Recorded evidence can be used if witnesses no longer arc
available. Id. art. 640.
4. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973); Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 748
(1993).
5. III. v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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criminal court cannot ordinarily try a foreigner who has remained
outside the United States, but in such cases the United States is
more likely to lack appropriate prescriptive jurisdiction over the
offense. The in absentia rule thus serves as a proxy for appropriate
division of legislative jurisdiction among national legal systems.
So, too, we worry that the substantive law of a particular nation
may be unjust; this is one reason why international law respects the
right to provide asylum to ordinary defendants. A ban on in absen-
tia trials also inhibits the application of unjust law. This is, one
trusts, not apropos of the war crimes trials proposed for the former
Yugoslavia.
My own view is that the Secretary-General indulged in an over-
reading in his claim that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights forbade the trial of alleged Yugoslav war criminals
not physically present in the Hague. Clearly they have a right to be
present if they wish to be, and to have full notice of the proceed-
ings. No one should be able to exclude a defendant and have the
trial in secret. But if the defendant voluntarily chooses to absent
himself, I question whether the United Nations is \vise-certainIy it
is not required-to prevent the proof of the offense.
As every working prosecutor knows, trial proof suffers \vith the
passage of time. The statute of limitations is in part a recognition
of practical limits on the ability to conduct a probative trial. \Vhen
I served as a federal prosecutor, I was once told that a long-time
fugitive from the United States might be returning. I was not
entirely delighted, for there is nothing worse than trying a fifteen-
year-old case. It cannot be done well. The \vitnesses have died,
and memories faded. If you value viva voce proof, the freshness
and immediacy of eye\vitness testimony-and these are an impor-
tant element of fairness-the trial must take place reasonably soon
after the commission of a crime.
An alternative, of course, is for the Security Council to be more
aggressive about procuring the defendants. The Yugoslav Tribunal
has the power to call upon any national state to produce defend-
ants who are hiding in its territory. Under articles 25, 48, and 103
. of the United Nations Charter, member states are obliged to coop-
erate with the Security Council. But in practice, a state may move
slowly, allowing a defendant to flee, or may claim it cannot locate
the defendant. It is unrealistic to wait for the moment when a war
crimes defendant needs triple bypass heart surgery and happens to
travel to a prosecutorially-minded state. People who are facing
international charges are not likely to leave their lair.
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The intimation of the Lockerbie case is that the Security Council
has power under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to
force the production of a criminal defendant for crimes of universal
jurisdiction by economic sanctions or even force of arms.6 In
Lockerbie, Libya was called upon to surrender the defendants even
though ordinarily there is no customary duty to do so. So, too, the
United Nations declared its intention to proceed against members
of General Aidid's forces in Somalia who ambushed U.N.
peacekeeping forces, even where the leader of those belligerent
forces would not turn them over.
Article 42 of the Charter empowers the Council to maintain and
restore international peace and security. If that power extends to
creating an international tribunal, surely it extends to making that
tribunal effective. Many of us have scruples about the Alvarez-
Machain case7 and the unilateral use of extraterritorial arrest to
seize criminal defendants because of the potential for abuse and
the lack of transparency in the decision process. But where it is a
multilateral institution acting with the concurrence of its members,
and the United States can regulate the decision through its veto, it
may be a different state of affairs. Practically speaking, one must
recognize that after five to ten years, cases are not triable. If they
are mounted, it is only at the cost of another ideal, that of fresh,
reliable testimony. If one is serious about the international prose-
cution of grave breaches of the law of war, the enforcement of
international process under chapter VII must be considered.
II. THE ApPLICABLE LAW FOR WAR CRIMES
A second problem concerns the sources of applicable law for
offenses that have been committed in the fighting in Bosnia-Herze-
govina and elsewhere. Possible sources of law to penalize the
humanitarian outrages in the former Yugoslavia include crimes
against humanity, genocide, and breaches or grave breaches of the
law of war.
The statute of the Court proposed by Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali and approved by the Security Council draws upon
6. See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3036th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRESn48 (1992)
(ordering Libya to extradite two of its nationals suspected of the Lockerbie bombing, and
providing for global sanctions should Libya refuse); cf. Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.CJ. 114, 136-37 (Apr. 14) (concurring opinion of Judges
Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume, and Aguilar Mawdsley).
7. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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these categories: crimes against humanity, genocide, violations of
the customary law of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions. The difficulty is that these sources of law involve compli-
cated jurisdictional prerequisites and elements of proof.
What trial prosecutors know is that every time you add an ele-
ment of proof to the criminal case, even if it is a jurisdictional ele-
ment, you are lessening the odds of a conviction. To be sure, in the
Yugoslav case the fact-finding will be performed by trial judges,
rather than jurors, and will require only a majority, rather than a
unanimous verdict. But new prosecutors sometimes find to their
surprise that judges can be even more demanding than jurors about
factual proof, perhaps because they feel more trepidation deciding
as a small chamber where the jury has the comfort of larger num-
bers. Any new element of a crime diminishes the probability of a
successful prosecution.
The charge of crimes against humanity was invoked at Nurem-
berg for the punishment of the Nazis' grotesque killings involving
systematic planning and grossly invidious motivation. At Nurem-
berg the prosecution was limited to crimes against humanity com-
mitted "in execution of or in connection with" crimes against peace
and conventional war crimes.8 These conditions would undoubt-
edly complicate the case in the former Yugoslavia, and the Tribunal
would be well advised to discard these unduly cautious limitations.
Proving genocide can also be difficult. Genocide requires the
"intent to destroy, in whole or in part" a religious, ethnic, national,
or racial group. The definition adds a very difficult element of spe-
cific intent to the prosecution.9 Most crimes of domestic jurisdic-
tion require only general intent. The prosecution does not have to
show anything about the person's state of mind except that he was
doing the action voluntarily and knew the nature of his action. It
will be a trying task to prove the specific intent of a brigade com-
mander whose men ran amok-to show that he was allowing the
killing of civilians in order to exterminate Muslims rather than
(horrible as it is) to force civilians from the area. There will likely
be no record of the commander's contemporaneous statements;
soldiers in an internecine war rarely record the reason they are kill-
8. See Formulation of the NOrnberg Principles, 1950 U.N.Y.B. 852, 852-57.
9. See the U.S. reservations and understandings with respect to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 28 I.L.M. 779, 782 (1989) (genocide
requires "specific intent to destroy, in whole or in sllbstalllial part") (emphasis added).
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ing. Requiring proof of specific intent in the melee of civil war
assures a formidable obstacle to any prosecution.
The United Nations statute for the Yugoslav Tribunal allows cer-
tain charges under the customary law of war, jus in bello, and these
will fit some of the disturbing activities of the conflict. The statute
allows prosecution of the wanton destruction of cities and towns
and the bombardment of undefended towns, devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity. The bombardment of Sarajevo and the
sniper fire that felled civilians on the street would be within range.
But the case can be hard to prove in the particular. A town under
siege may host a militia that operates at night, and perhaps even
provokes the enemy. How will we prove beyond doubt that there
was no military necessity for a bombardment and that the town was
truly undefended?
The categories of customary law recited in the Tribunal's statute
do not specifically note some of the practices that disturb us most
profoundly, including the slaughter of civilians, the rape of female
noncombatants, and the detention of villagers under inhuman con-
ditions. These signal types of violence are not among the examples
given by the Tribunal's statute as violations of the customary law of
war, though the statute includes the full scope of "the laws or cus-
toms of war."lO It would have been useful didactically, as an assur-
ance to the prosecutors, and to avoid any question of the scope of
the law of war in an internecine conflict, to name these offenses
against noncombatants specifically in the statute.
An alternate source of law is the Geneva Convention for the
Protection of Civilians (Geneva IV)l1 as supplemented by the 1977
Protocols I and IIY Geneva IV has a clear application to some of
the atrocities that have taken place. The Geneva Conventions'
"universal" article 3 forbids, even in conflicts not of an interna-
10. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCaR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993),
reprinted in 32 LL.M. 1202 (1993).
11. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in TIme of War of
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV] (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950; entered into force for the United States Feb. 2, 1956).
12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978). The United States has signed Protocols I and II. Protocol I has proved
controversial in some of its provisions, and Senate action on Protocol II is awaiting
consideration of Protocol 1.
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tional character, any violence to life and person, the taking of hos-
tages, and outrages against personal dignity,13 which could easily
include systematic rape. The problem with the delicate drafting of
Geneva IV is in the definition of grave breaches. Grave breaches
allow universal jurisdiction-the right of any member country to
prosecute the offense regardless of the nationality of the victim or
offender or the place of the crime. Sadly, grave breaches are
defined to exclude domestic conflict; grave breaches are offenses
committed against people "protected by" the Convention, and this
protection is defined to include only the non-nationals of the con-
tracting party.14 When you slaughter your fellow countrymen, it is
not a grave breach.
There are strategies nonetheless that could make Geneva IV a
source of norms. The reasons we should try to do this are several.
The Geneva Conventions' protections of civilians are important
and germane in the context of civil conflicts; the low-tech fighting
of an internecine war often sees the worst war crimes violations.
Civil war combatants include militia and pick-up armies
unschooled in the classical sense of what it means to be a soldier.
Civil wars are of great brutality, ,vith atavistic hatreds. Like inter-
national conflicts, these wars require the deterrence of stringent
humanitarian law.
Three separate strategies would allow us to apply Geneva IV to
a non-international case. The first is to say that Geneva IV is a
source of norms, though not jurisdiction. We can rely upon
Geneva fot a clean articulation of the governing norms for all
forms of warfare, while allowing jurisdiction here to flow from the
U.N. Charter, through chapter VII's own (albeit limited) law-creat-
mg power.
Second, and I think Ted Meron may raise an eyebrow here, one
can gloss the language of Geneva IV on jurisdiction. While
Geneva IV excludes nationals from the protection of the Conven-
tion, it is contemplating the case where the military party considers
the excluded civilians to be its own nationals. Where a rump bel-
ligerent engages in ethnic cleansing of a region and declares itself
to be a separate state banishing residents of another heritage, the
13. Geneva IV, supra note 11, art. 3., 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-90.
14. See id. art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 290 ("Persons protected by the
Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.").
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belligerent can be estopped from claiming "co-nationality" so far
as Geneva is concerned.
The third strategy builds upon the general duties of each party
under Geneva IV. Though universal jurisdiction is restricted to
grave breaches, each contracting party is bound to take measures
for the "suppression of all acts contrary to provisions of the present
Convention."15 Under general principles of law, where a party has
failed to act, equity allows a substitution. Where an act ought to
have been done, equity will deem it done. On this ground the
United Nations could say that where Serbia or the rump Serb state
("Republica Srpska") of Bosnia-Herzegovina should have taken
action to suppress war crimes, the Security Council can act as a
substitute by vesting jurisdiction in the ad hoc Tribunal.
III. THE POWER TO PARDON AND TO DECLINE PROSECUTION
Let me take a different direction for a moment-and look at a
circumstance that by necessity may limit the range of the War
Crimes Tribunal. The design of the Yugoslav Tribunal has not con-
fronted the problem of prosecutorial discretion and the pardon
power. Common lawyers are familiar with prosecutorial discre-
tion-selecting which cases will go forward. Prosecutorial discre-
tion must exclude partisan politics, but it does not always exclude a
more statesmanlike politics, weighing a criminal prosecution
against other values that may be harmed by the prosecution. This
balancing occurs in many contexts. In a federal prosecution, for
example, one must sometimes weigh foreign policy and intelligence
interests against the importance of enforcing federal law. In the
United States, some have criticized the practice of allowing a spe-
cial prosecutor to operate independently from the president,
because he cannot balance those profound interests with the same
authority as the president.
So here the U.N. has divorced the Yugoslav prosecution from
the necessities of state. It may not be possible to bring about a
peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia if the Tribunal is going
forward with active prosecutions of the state leaders of the bellig-
erent parties. Even if the political leadership should change, it may
be impossible for the new governments to hand over former lead-
ers and remain in power. It will be difficult to conduct diplomacy
with someone who is the subject of an unexecuted arrest warrant,
15. Id. art. 146,6 U.S.T. at 3616, 75 U.N.T.S. at 386 (emphasis added).
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and a main object of our efforts in the former Yugoslavia must be
to quell the fighting. As many liberal Argentineans argued in their
own civil war, you may need to accept a punto final, and sacrifice
the prosecutorial interest in general deterrence for the sake of
future peace. This problem is especially acute in prosecuting lead-
ers of a belligerent state.
For the followers, the lack of prosecutorial discretion is also a
problem. There may be many hundreds of culpable soldiers, mili-
tia, and politicians in the Yugoslav situation. You cannot prosecute
them all. In post-war Germany the problem was handled sotto
voce by failure to act. But taking seriously the civil law principle of
full prosecution would keep the Yugoslav Tribunal in business for
years and years.
A pardon power resides in the political organs of every domestic
constitution because there are times when stabilizing a situation to
allow civic rebuilding may be more important than extended gen-
eral deterrence or vindication of the past. In post-war Germany it
was important to have war crimes trials as historical lesson and
deterrent, and indeed some of us may believe that the prosecutions
were unduly curtailed with the onset of the Cold War. But one
cannot assume that full prosecution of all actors is possible in a
civil conflict.
The statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal has not adequately pro-
vided for this reality. It only says in article 28 that if a defendant
has been sentenced to a term and the domestic law of the country
in which he was convicted provides for a pardon or commutation,
then the president of the Tribunal can exercise similar power.16
There is no provision for conscientious choice of cases at the initia-
tion level, or recognition that there might come a time when a
broader amnesty or pardon is necessary. These are difficult deci-
sions, and Ambassador Madeleine Albright has properly expressed
the U.S. commitment to advance the war crimes prosecutions as far
as humanly possible. But one might also surmise that the slow start
of the Tribunal reflects a fear that the Tribunal's work could
impede the peace process. Most civil wars end \vith amnesty. This
is a fact of history and political life. It does not serve the interests
of candor to fail to address the matter.
16. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, art. 28, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1200.
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